Sudan Crisis Tests US Diplomacy and Commitment to Protecting Democracy Around the World

It’s been three months since the October 25th military coup derailed the transition to democracy in Sudan, and three weeks since Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned, leaving the Sudanese Revolution at the mercy of the coup leaders General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and warlord Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti. Burhan has named a caretaker government. Meanwhile, peaceful street protests and acts of civil disobedience continue mostly led by thousands of Resistance Committees across the country in heroic defiance of the deadly security and militia forces. The UN mediation process launched earlier this month has yet to yield a breakthrough because the coup leaders insist on participating in governance; while civilians reject any form of power sharing with the military. Unfortunately, the civilian opposition lacks a unified leadership, and no single figure has emerged for people to rally behind. Although multiple “initiatives” on how to complete the transitional period have appeared, these have not coalesced into one proposal. Thus, the impasse continues while all economic gains made under Hamdok’s government dissipate and vicious repression of protesters becomes the daily norm.

The US has condemned the military takeover in Sudan. But, so far, it has relied on diplomatic negotiations with the coup leaders and its regional allies – Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Israel – to restore the transitional process. Alas, all four openly support military rule in Sudan. For their part, the coup leaders have shown no sign of backing down; indeed, they have acted defiantly after every meeting with a US envoy. Burhan announced his coup barely an hour after Jeffrey Feltman, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, left Khartoum with assurances of the military’s commitment to the democratic transition. In November, Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, received similar assurances from Burhan. The next day peaceful protests were met with teargas and live ammunition. This week, Burhan again assured her military leaders were “committed to dialogue to resolve the current crisis.” As Phee herself stated in a tweet, what followed was “more violence against protestors [and] detention of civil society activists.” 

President Biden has made the protection of democracy a hallmark goal of his Administration. The crisis in Sudan is testing the US commitment to this goal and the efficacy of American diplomacy in achieving it. Major geopolitical fronts such as Russia and Ukraine typically occupy most of US foreign policy and media attention. And yet the way the Biden Administration handles struggles for democracy in seemingly insignificant countries like Sudan sends powerful signals to autocrats everywhere. The US could deploy the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which authorizes sanctions, such as freezing of assets, on government officials responsible for “gross violations of international recognized human rights,” including actions that suppress freedom of “expression, association, assembly and democratic elections.” Last year, the Treasury Department issued sanctions against three Cuban officials for “violence against peaceful protestors,” and against General Filipos Woldeyohannes, leader of the Eritrean Defense Forces, “for his connection with serious human rights abuse committed during the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia.” The Sudanese people have documented the military’s atrocities with dozens of video and audio evidence that should satisfy the “credible information” threshold for the Magnitsky Act. The one element that seems to separate Cuba and Eritrea from Sudan when it comes to the sanctions option is that American allies in the region are standing firm behind the Sudanese military. 

Congress has already begun the process for deploying targeted sanctions against the Sudanese army leaders. Last November, Senator Chris Coons filed legislation to authorize a Sudan Democracy Act that mandates sanctions “against individual actors who undermine a civilian-led democratic transition, peace, and human rights in Sudan.” Since then, over 70 protesters have been killed in Khartoum alone, thousands injured, and an unknown number, including children, are detained at undisclosed locations. The Sudanese army and its powerful militia leader have built a vast economic empire, with assets inside and outside Sudan. Sanctions on their individual and corporate holdings would disrupt the source of finance for their murderous campaign against protesters and weaken their power relative to the civilian opposition. 

On Monday, Assistant Secretary Phee stated that the coup leaders’ actions “tell a different story” than their public comments, and that their actions “will have consequences.” Next week, she will testify in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on “Sudan’s imperiled transition.” Based on her recommendations, the Sudan Democracy Act may move ahead in Congress, which would amount to an admission that diplomacy has failed. Only time will tell whether targeted sanctions will help dislodge the military from government in Sudan. But, the lesson for the Biden Administration is that allying with undemocratic regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Israel will not help protect democracy around the world. 

مليونية ١٧ يناير

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Risch Statement on Violence During Sudanese Protests, November 17, 2021. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/risch-statement-on-violence-during-sudanese-protests. 

Sen. Coons files legislation to the National Defense Authorization Act to sanction Sudan’s military leaders. November 9, 2021. https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sen-coons-files-legislation-to-the-national-defense-authorization-act-to-sanction-sudans-military-leaders.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release, August 19, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0327 

US Department of the Treasury Press Release, August 23, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0329

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: US Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup” February 1, 2022. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/sudans-imperiled-transition-us-policy-in-the-wake-of-the-october-25th-coup-020122

Bureau of African Affairs. https://twitter.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/1485746693677199366

Agreement Under Duress

What are we to make of ‘the agreement’ signed yesterday between Hamdok and the Military? The threat of American sanctions on the coup leaders (Burhan and Hemedti) has quickly accomplished what diplomacy did not. But the situation has also gotten murkier. The resistance committees, major political parties and leaders, and the Professionals Association have rejected the agreement on the spot, while American and European allies welcomed it with caution. On social media, Hamdok has already been called a traitor. Seeing him sitting next to Burhan and Hemedti after their murderous rampage against protesters in the last three weeks is hard to stomach. Yet, it is not simple to render judgment about Hamdok’s commitment to the revolution or what this agreement will accomplish. We have little knowledge of the conditions under which Hamdok agreed to sign. He was under house arrest until yesterday, cut off from the rest of the world, with at least four members of his Cabinet detained in undisclosed locations. How possibly could he make a meaningful decision under these circumstances? Did he even know how many people were killed, injured, arrested, and abused by security forces, police and RSF militia since the coup? 

On the surface, it appears that civilians have forced Burhan to cancel the decision removing Hamdok. But, the entire event in effect affirms the military’s power to dismiss and reinstate the Prime Minister at will, and to define the conditions of governance for the rest of the transitional period. The agreement document itself (Al-Rakuba Newspaper) is incoherent and full of ambiguity. Nothing is said of handing over the presidency of the Sovereign Council to civilians, which is now constitutionally overdue. But, wait, which sovereign council? Is it the original or the one that Burhan appointed after the coup? Instead of being the top priority, the release of political detainees is item 13 in the document. Only four, high profile, political leaders have been released since yesterday. The military coup order remains.

Hamdok has stated four reasons for signing the agreement: to help prevent more bloodshed, break the impasse and return the country to the transitional path, preserve the gains of the past two years on the peace and economy fronts, and strengthen democratic transformation by broadening participation and unifying all revolutionary forces (Al Jazeera Television). It is hard to disagree. As an economist, I deeply appreciate his desire to avoid squandering the remarkable achievements registered since 2019. From debt relief to a successful season in agriculture, these gains are in danger of being lost or compromised because of the coup. The question is: will returning to the same civilian-military partnership serve Hamdok’s goals? Now that his revolutionary mandate has somewhat eroded, how much can Hamdok accomplish? He has been criticized for what some see as a slow indecisive approach. This recent coup debacle may prompt him to act more expeditiously in the coming months. But, with so much opposition to the agreement, it’s fair to wonder whether he will even succeed in forming a new government from outside the coup supporters camp. 

The agreement, whatever one may think of it, poses a test to the civilian side of the political scene. To recover some political capital, Hamdok must insist on three conditions before moving further: immediate release of all political detainees, beginning with Cabinet members; no violence against future protests; and immediately turning over presidency of the Sovereign Council to a civilian. How he deals with the military response to protests in the next few days will tell a great deal about his options and his trust in the revolutionaries’ power to help move his agenda forward. In the meantime, the resistance committees and other revolutionary forces must act with a firm understanding that they are engaged in a long battle that must be fought in different ways on all fronts, with some flexibility. They should continue to pressure Hamdok and the coup leaders, while taking every opportunity to participate in governance and decision making to shape the conditions that will ensure free and credible elections. 

Sudan and Israel: Missed Opportunity

The October 25 military coup in Sudan has drawn condemnation from around the globe. The US, the UN Security Council, the EU, and the African Union have all called on the coup leaders to back down. The Biden Administration has managed to get Saudi Arabia and UAE – known supporters of military rule in Sudan – to join in calling for release of all those arrested and return to the civilian shared transitional process. Israel, on the other hand, is standing with the military junta. A delegation of Mossad and Defense officials visited Khartoum a few days after the coup in clear disregard for the vast popular protests in the country. Sudan has strategic value to Israel because of its geographical location on the Red Sea; the planned intelligence base near Port Sudan would put Israel in a good geopolitical position in relation to Iran. But, as the Israeli newspaper Haaretz believes, Israel’s “misguided” move may backfire – “turmoil in Sudan would undermine Israel's broader strategic goals.” (https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/saudi-arabia-to-sudan-why-israel-s-normalization-strategy-is-imploding-1.10353622.) 

       Sudan has been under pressure to normalize relations with Israel since the Trump Administration set this as the price for being removed from the list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” The military side of the Transitional Government was eager to move ahead with this part of the “Abraham Accords.” The civilian component of the government went along with repealing the 1958 law boycotting Israel, but prefers to proceed more cautiously, given the country’s long-standing solidarity with the Palestinian people. Sudan was host to the 1967 Arab League Summit in the aftermath of the Six Day War, which led to the Khartoum Resolution: no peace, no recognition, no negotiation with Israel. Indeed, Khartoum is known as “the three No’s capital.” In the eyes of many Sudanese, normalizing relations with Israel amounts to betrayal of their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Continued Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza have done little to soften this feeling. As Prime Minister Hamdok stated, normalizing relations requires a broad deliberative process. But, in its rush for strategic advantage and ostensible acceptance by more Arab and Muslim countries, the Israeli government has chosen to side with the military generals against the majority of the Sudanese people. 

       Many things have changed since 1967. Feelings toward 'the Arab World' in Sudan now are anything but warm; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE were strong supporters of Omar Al-Bashir’s brutal regime, and may have played a role in the recent coup. In contrast, Israel has taken in thousands of Sudanese refugees fleeing his genocide in Darfur. These new realities offered some potential for exploring a new path of engagement between the two countries. Indeed, some efforts to recover the lost history of Jews in Sudan, and preliminary attempts to open dialogue between Sudanese and Jewish communities in the Diaspora were just beginning. With Israel’s failure to side with “freedom, peace, and justice” (the motto of the uprising in Sudan), hope for a new start has been dimmed if not extinguished altogether. In the last two years, the Sudanese people have embarked on a long arduous journey toward building a pluralistic democratic society; they have rejected hegemonic religious ideology and political oppression. Countries that do not support these principles are not welcome. 

       The peoples of Sudan and Israel do share some common ground: both have been scarred by long running war and conflict, both countries have experienced isolation and being shunned by other nations, both must fight religious extremism, and both need to think through the dilemmas posed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The two peoples inevitably must find a path toward new understandings and coexistence. Israeli support of military dictatorship in Sudan does not help this process. What would help is if the Israeli people take a critical stand against their government’s foreign policy toward Sudan.

Adding Insult to Injury

Day 9 of General Abdel Fattah El-Burhan’s doomed military coup. Protests have continued, culminating in the massive October 30 marches inside Sudan and in 70 cities around the world. The cycle of resistance and repression goes on. Unarmed demonstrators are met with tear gas and live ammunition, and security forces are carrying out a wide campaign of arrests against civilian leaders and activists. The Internet blackout remains. Yet, civil disobedience is largely holding up; most private business and government offices are closed. Adding insult to injury, Burhan ordered the release from prison of several leading figures of El-Bashir’s deposed regime, while keeping Prime Minster Hamdok and the majority of his Cabinet under arrest. Fortunately, this brazen move crystallizes the coup’s primary goal: to bring back Bashir’s ousted dictatorship under new management. 

The truth of the matter is that the Bashir regime has never left since he was ousted in April 2019. Its core elements are still in place: military empire, security forces, the Muslim Brothers’ business monopolies, and thousands of loyalists installed throughout the civil service. All along, this coalition has been busy manufacturing crises, from extreme shortages of daily consumer goods to random muggings and other personal safety violations, in hopes of inducing frustration and impatience with the Transitional Government. The latest one of these destructive efforts was the closure of shipping facilities in Port Sudan for more than a month under the guise of a protest by people in the eastern region, which has created more shortages and cost the country millions of dollars in shipping fines every day. This well-funded and organized campaign has succeeded in inflicting great hardship on regular people, but has not broken their resolve to return to full civilian rule.   

Burhan has yet to form the new government he promised, although he made a few key appointments. First, he doesn’t have a political base beside Bashir loyalists and two opportunistic armed rebel movement leaders. No independent credible candidates are lining up to fill vacant positions. Second, Bashir loyalists are known for preferring to cause mayhem only in the dark; they don’t have the courage to face the massive opposition, which has hardened since the coup. The popular resistance committees are now unwilling to return to the power sharing arrangement with the military. For them, nothing but a fully civilian government will do this time. Any Burhan government will be immediately rejected on the street. (“Burhan doesn't have a clean path to form a government in the way that he wanted,” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-military-leaders-could-face-isolation-after-coup-2021-11-01/ ). 

Representatives from the troika countries, the UN, and South Sudan are in Khartoum to mediate. It appears five compromise proposals are circulating. Prime Minister Hamdok is rightly insisting on the release of all who have been arrested, including his Cabinet members, and restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Government before entertaining any proposals. Burhan has miscalculated. Yesterday, in a clear sign of confusion, the Bashir loyalists released just two days ago were arrested again. The push back from the street has far exceeded his expectations. His regional backers – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE – are silent. With the exception of Russia and Israel, there appears to be no sympathizers with his coup. But, don’t hang high hopes on the ‘international community.’ It hasn’t come through for the people of Myanmar. What will matter is whether the balance of international and regional geopolitical and economic interests in Sudan favors the Generals or the street. 

حرية سلام و عدالة

Freedom, Peace, Justice

Translation by Adil Zeinelabdin

زيادة الطين بلة

اليوم التاسع من انقلاب الجنرال عبد الفتاح البرهان العسكري المشؤوم. تواصلت الاحتجاجات لتبلغ ذروتها في مواكب 30 أكتوبر الهائلة داخل السودان وفي 70 مدينة حول العالم. وهكذا فإن دائرة القمع والمقاومة تدور. تواجه المظاهرات السلمية بالغاز المسيل للدموع زالرصاص الحي، وتقوم قوات الامن بحملات اعتقالات واسعة تجاه القادة المدنيين والنشطاء بينما لاتزال خدمة الانترنت مقطوعة. ورغم ذلك فإن العصيان المدني مازال صامدا بدرجة كبيرة؛ فغالبية محلات القطاع الخاص والمكاتب الحكومية مازالت مغلقة. أما ما زاد الطين بلة فهو إقدام البرهان على الإفراج عن عدد من الشخسيات البارزة في نظام المخلوع البشيربينما أبقى على رئيس الوزراء حمدوك ومعظم أفراد طاقمه الوزاري رهن الاعتقال. ولحسن الحط فأن هذه الخطوة الجريئة بلورت الهدف الرئيس وراء الانقلاب، وهوإعادة نظام البشيرالمباد تحت إدارة جديدة.  

في حقيقة الامر فإن نظام البشير لم يرحل إطلاقا منذ الاطاحة به في أبريل 2019. فكل أعضاؤه الاساسيون مازالوا في أماكنهم: الامبراطورية العسكرية، القوات الأمنية، احتكارات رجال أعمال الاخوان المسلمين، وآلاف الموالين الذين تم زرعهم في مفاصل الخدمة المدنية. ظل هذا التحالف طوال الوقت مشغولا بصنع الازمات من نقص حاد في السلع الاستهلاكية اليومية إلى أعمال النهب العشوائية والانتهاكات الامنية الشخصية الاخرى، على أمل إحداث إحباط وعدم صبر على الحكومة الانتقالية. آخر هذه الجهود المدمرة كان إغلاق مراقق الشحن في ميناء بورت سودان لأكثر من شهر وذلك تحت ستار احتجاجات مواطني اقليم الشرق، والتي خلقت المزيد من النقص وكلفت البلاد ملايين الدولارات يوميا في شكل غرامات شحن. هذه الحملة المنطمة والممولة جيدا نجحت في إلحاق الكثير من المشقة والعنت بالناس العاديين لكنها لم تفلح في كسر تصميمهم وعزمهم على العودة الكاملة للحكم المدني.  

لم يفي البرهان حتى الآن بوعده تشكيل حكومة رغم أنه قد قام بالقليل من التعيينات المفتاحية. أولاً: لا يملك البرهان قاعدة سياسية غير أنصار البشير واثنين من قادة الحركات المسلحة الانتهازيين. فليس هناك رتل من المرشحين المستقلين ذوي المصداقية مصطفين لملء المقاعد الشاغرة. ثانيا: إن أنصار البشير معروف عنهم أنهم يفضلون إثارة القلاقل في الظلام فحسب، فهم لا يملكون الشجاعة لمواجهة معارضة واسعة النطاق  ما ازدادت إلا صلابة منذ الانقلاب. إن لجان المقاومة الشعبية هي الان لا تريد العودة إلى اتفاقية شراكة السلطة مع العسكر. فبالنسبة لهم لا شئ يمكن قبوله هذه المرة غير الحكم المدني الكامل. إن أي حكومة يشكلها البرهان سوف يتم رفضها مباشرة من قبل الشارع.  (" البرهان لايملك سبيلا ممهدا لتشكيل حكومة بالطريقة التي يريدها.")  

 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-military-leaders-could-face-isolation-after-coup-2021-11-01/).   

إن مندوين من دول الترويكا ، الامم المتحدة، وجنوب السودان متواجدون في الخرطوم للوساطة ويبدو أن هناك خمس مقترحات تسوية يتم تداولها.  فرئيس الوزراء حمدوك مصر وبحق على إطلاق سراح كل الذين اعتقلوا ومن بينهم وزرائه، واستعادة الحكومة الانتقالية بقيادة مدنية قبل النظر في أية مقترحات. لقد أخطأ البرهان الحسابات. بالأمس وفي إشارة واضحة للتخبط، فإن أنصار البشير الذين أطلق سراحهم قبل يومين فقط، تم اعتقالهم مرة أخرى. أن الدفع العكسي من الشارع  قد فاق كل توقعاته، وحلفاؤه الاقليميون – مصر، السعودية، والامارات صامتون. فباستثناء روسيا وإسرائيل، فلا يظهر أن هناك متعاطفين مع انقلابه. لكن لا يجب التعويل كثيرا على "المجتمع الدولي". فها هو لم يقم بواجبه  لنجدة الناس في ميانمار. الذي يبقي في النهاية هو ما إذا كانت كفة الموازين الجيوسياسية الدولية والاقليمية والمصالح الاقتصادية في السودان ستميل نحو الجنرالات أم الشارع.  

 ترجمة الأستاذ عادل زين العابدين