Sudan Revolution -- Meeting the Challenge of Peace

Meeting the challenge of Peace

Now that the new Cabinet has been formed, where does the goal of bringing about sustained peace, which Prime Minister Hamdouk talked about, fit? What are the requirements for peace? Given the historic injustices to be corrected and the diversity and geographical expanse of the armed rebel movements, a first step would have been to establish a Ministry or Department of Peace and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Peace is the proclaimed highest priority of the Transitional Government (TG). Therefore, the absence of such a department is somewhat surprising and, could be, troubling. The institution of peace will require major long-term effort, commitment of resources, and massive coordination between all branches of government – defense, interior, economy, foreign relations, health, and education, among others – and between government and civil society organizations (CSOs). This task cannot be left to an ad hoc commission or provisional office. The peace process warrants a cabinet level body, with the requisite authority and budget so that it can begin to holistically identify and work to uproot the causes behind the country’s long running wars.

To be sure, PM Hamdouk has already shown wisdom, tough-mindedness, and determination to honor the Revolution’s call for Freedom, Peace, & Justice. Announcement of the new cabinet was delayed because he rightly insisted on greater representation of women, youth, and historically marginalized regions. Handling the issue of peace will require orders of magnitude more of his acumen, tenacity, and patience. The approach to ending armed conflict in Sudan should not be based on partial solutions, customary gestures, and modest measures. Lasting national redress of our historic wrongs must to some extent correspond to the horrific injuries inflicted over decades on people in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile, and the neglect and oppression of other regions. It demands significant change in official outlook and public policy tangibly reflected in government structure.

Instituting peace will take years of sustained political effort and cultural change. Some of the challenging tasks ahead include:

·      Disarmament and demilitarization of the state through reduction in the size of the regular armed forces, dissolution of all militias, and dismantling the war economy fueled by arms traders and dealers both domestic and international.

·      Repatriation of displaced populations, if original homelands are suitable, resettlement in new areas, or proper accommodation in their current settlement areas in Khartoum and other cities across the country. All three options entail new or rebuilt housing, infrastructure, services, and sources of livelihood.

·      Mobilization of a substantial work force of builders, engineers, doctors, teachers, conflict resolution experts, among other specialists from different regions in the country, and drawing on human capacities in the Diaspora. This will help reduce the general level of unemployment. But, to secure the financial resources for such a national work program, Diaspora resources and assistance from international development agencies may be necessary in the early stages. Financial managers and grant officers will be needed.

·      Post-conflict rehabilitation to provide wide ranging long term healthcare to people in war affected areas, including mental health for survivors of mass brutality, killings and sexual assault, and to re-integrate child soldiers. This work will claim a significant portion of the national budget, but it is crucial for rebuilding society and the country’s human capital.

·      Cultural transformation in the longer term is necessary to remove the militaristic ideology of the National Islamic Front that has been inculcated through education and the media in the last 30 years, which glorified war, created or deepened tribal identification and religious hostility, and privileged one culture over all others. This transformation, while it cannot be achieved by legal fiat, is a necessary condition for long lasting peace. A government department tasked with ensuring that public policies and practices, especially in education, are consistent with this goal would go a long way toward setting a climate of cohesion and reconciliation.

No one knows how peace talks with the Revolutionary Front will go and how long they might take. But, as negotiations are underway, TG should not wait for the signing of a peace treaty. It should promptly begin to address the urgent needs of the displaced. The paucity of resources will impose a triage process on what regions and post-war dilemmas to tackle first, which makes the job even more challenging. It is, therefore, imperative to establish a practical partnership with domestic CSOs and Diasporic initiatives to accomplish as much as possible in the near future.

The causes behind Sudan’s post-colonial history of armed conflict are embedded in its politics, economy, and cultural habits. Consequently, peace demands a response proportionate in gravity and magnitude. The hope is that the transitional leadership will quickly come to realize that a dedicated cabinet level body, laser focused on peace and post-conflict reconstruction constitutes the right first step.

 EOZ

Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101-- Constitutional Declaration Signed

Sudan 2018-19 revolution 101

The CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

Today, August 17, witnessed the formal signing of the Constitutional Declaration by FFC (Forces for Freedom & Change) and TMC (Transitional Military Council), thereby launching the three-year transitional period toward democratic civilian rule in Sudan. The public has not seen the constitutional document yet, but it is reported that TMC did not get the blanket immunity they asked for, and that RSF will become part of the armed forces of Sudan, i.e., the regular army. The event was held with great formality and fanfare at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, and followed by enormous celebrations and self-congratulations by scores of Sudanese in this city and across the country.

The celebration is warranted as this day signals the end of Basheer and the National Congress Party’s 30-year destructive occupation of Sudan. For many Sudanese, these 30 years constitute a loss in the country’s historical ledger. Yet, the celebration must be tempered by deep awareness that this day represents only the first step in what will certainly be a long, difficult, and treacherous journey. There are too many complex problems to solve; too many different voices and opinions weighted down by heavy historical baggage; too much external influence and meddling; and the grave danger of armed conflict stemming from excessive militarization.

Ending the different internal wars by reaching permanent peace treaties with all the armed rebel movements is the top priority of the transitional government. But, the FFC coalition is already fractured because of the rebel movements’ insistence on special accommodations – specific shares of positions prior to the formation of the transitional government – to represent the marginalized areas and those affected by war. The contrast between the posh and polished scene at the Friendship Hall, and the helpless thousands whose homes were being swamped by torrential rain on the outskirts of Khartoum betrayed the problem of inequality and marginalization which the armed movements are fighting to end.

Another striking image today is the heavy presence of more than a dozen heads of state and high level representatives of different countries and international organizations – most notably, Chad, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the US, AU and EU. These are being called friends of Sudan, but their participation in the ceremony and especially co-signing of the constitutional document that will govern the transitional period eerily reveals the great fragility of the agreement, and the erosion of national autonomy that is the legacy of Basheer’s 30-year rule. One cannot but feel the irony that some Sudanese are recalling Muhammed Wardi’s celebrated ballad “Today We Raise the Flag of Our Independence” marking Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956. But, today the country is effectively in the custody of almost 10 external entities, soon to be joined (or rejoined) by the IMF and the World Bank. This loss of autonomy may be the worst of Basheer’s crimes against the people of Sudan, together with militarization, destruction of the economy and the civil service, and institution of tribal identities and divisions.

In all events, the transitional government and process will likely fall short of the greatness of the uprising and the protesters’ aspirations partly because the vast breadth of the FFC coalition and the matter-of-fact power of the military, in addition to international pressure, have allowed only a hybrid compromising outcome. Therefore, it would be a mistake to put all hopes on the transitional government, no matter how strong the civilian majority in it is. The great lesson of the past eight months, is that the Sudanese people have put together a highly effective model of peaceful civil organization, mass resistance, and long distance coordination. This was clear in the thousands of disciplined, highly responsive neighborhood committees and the communication channels between the street and FFC leadership that allowed quick mobilization of massive marches all over the country, especially during the Internet blackout, which TMC thought would paralyze the opposition. It is this energy and determination in the face of continued violence against peaceful protesters that will make possible the transition to democratic civilian rule and beyond. The protestors on the ground are the safety valve of the uprising against cooptation or sabotage.

Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101 -- The Agreement II

Sudan revolution 101

The Agreement II

August 17, 2019 -- It’s been more than a month since I wrote my last blog, on July 11. Much has occurred since then although not as much as the people in Sudan would like to see. I thought then the delay in signing the power sharing agreement between FFC (Forces for Freedom & Change, the Sudanese opposition coalition) and TMC (the Transitional Military Council) would not matter if more time was needed to achieve more clarity about critical issues, but it would be a setback if the delay simply led to new concessions to TMC. Two days later, people all over Sudan took to the streets to mark 40 days since the June 3^rd massacre, and to stress their demands for justice. By the end of the week, the African Union and Ethiopian mediators had announced that the two sides have signed the power sharing agreement.

Yet, soon it was revealed that what FFC and TMC signed on July 17 was a “Political Agreement,” laying out the by-then-familiar governance structure in the transitional period – a Sovereign Council, a Cabinet, and a Legislative Council. A second document named “the Constitutional Agreement” – governing the transitional period – was yet to be finalized and signed. This second step came as a surprise to most since there was no prior talk of two separate documents. The most astonishing development was that the political agreement just signed seemed to acquiesce to TMC’s desire for full immunity from criminal charges. This was met with general disapproval. The Communist Party, a member of FFC, rejected the agreement. So did three armed rebel movements (also FFC members), arguing that the “unique” concerns of people in marginalized regions were not recognized in the document. This threatened to derail the entire process. Swiftly arranged talks in Addis Ababa between FFC leadership and the rebels managed to smooth things over and avoid a total break-down.

In the meantime, TMC moved ahead with its ‘investigation’ of the June 3^rd massacre. As widely expected, the findings of their ‘commission of inquiry’ grossly underestimated the number of those killed or disappeared, and said nothing about the wide spread sexual assaults that accompanied the massacre. This sham was carried out even though the Political Agreement just signed stipulated forming an independent, regionally backed investigative body. FFC and protestors generally refused to accept this attempt to whitewash TMC’s involvement in the crime.

On July 30, as talks about the Constitutional document were underway, a unit of the Rapid Support Forces or other security/army personnel opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by high school students in El Obied, the third largest city outside of Khartoum. The students were protesting poor school conditions; in return, four of them were killed and dozens suffered injuries. The next day massive crowds marched in major cities around the country in solidarity. Collective anger over the murder of school children seems to have accelerated the pace of the talks over the constitutional document.

Since then, FFC & TMC have reached an agreement on the constitutional document, scheduled to be signed on August 17^th in a highly formalized ceremony, with attendance by representatives of several countries and regional and international political bodies. The three components of the transitional government would be formed and announced in the days to follow.

To say that all these arrangements are fragile would be a gross understatement. The process is taking too long, and the delays and passage of time provide ample opportunity for remnants of Basheer’s regime to intensify their destructive tactics, spread misinformation and sow division and mistrust within the FFC coalition.

The latest: The Constitutional Agreement was signed in Khartoum this afternoon.

@eimanzein