If there is one bright light in the midst of the armed conflict devastating Sudan since April 15, this light shines through the decentralization of governance and redistribution of people and resources away from the capital city Khartoum. Not only have millions of people fled to Wad Madani, Port Sudan, and other cities and rural areas, many businesses, doctors and other professionals have also moved their practices to havens not affected by the war. Some physicians are now performing advanced surgery in remote towns. Banks and Western Union operate in most regions outside of Darfur. Port Sudan has turned into an administrative capital. Shipments of Gum Arabic (Sudan’s major export) are finding their way from Kordofan in the west to the Port city on the Red Sea coast, using a different route than the main artery that passes through war torn Omdurman. In short, state and regional governors and many local officials are making decisions and logistical adjustments that in the past may have required approval and plenty of red tape from Khartoum. This forced massive relocation of people, services, and capacities is in effect reducing the concentration of power and economic hegemony that have ultimately led to the current dire conflict in Sudan.
This is good news for the country. But, for how long? How long will it be before supplies of food, fuel, and medicine run out despite appreciable international humanitarian assistance? There are limits to what can be accomplished locally under the continued influx of refugees, damage to national infrastructure facilities and networks, and complete absence of a central government.
The newly found capability of provincial governments will run into two forces that push in opposite directions. A centrifugal force heightens the risk of the country’s disintegration since, having relished more freedom, regional governments may be tempted to envision greater, more drastic autonomy from the center. On the other hand, not all problems can be resolved locally, especially in a large country with only one major seaport and sizable international airport. Among many limits are the loss of revenue from exports and coordination in management of shared resources between the different regions; the Nile waters run through ten different states, while the main oil export pipeline cuts into most of Sudan’s territory from the southwest to the northeast. This reality highlights the benefits of unity, even if a deeply flawed one, and represents a centripetal force that pushes against secession. The combined effect of these two forces favors the vision of a federation, with one national authority and several autonomously governed regions or states. A federal political system has been the vision for Sudan that many intellectuals and political leaders have hoped for ever since the country gained independence from Britain almost 70 years ago. It never came to fruition.
Sudan has limped along without a central government since Generals Burhan and Hemedti carried out their doomed military coupe in October 2021. Now, since their even more disastrous armed conflict, the destruction of homes, businesses and public utilities in Khartoum and the exodus of people to other regions have diminished the city’s monopoly on consequential decision making in politics, livelihoods and other daily life affairs for the rest of the country. The military still maintains its destructive power to kill, displace and starve millions of people, but, the allure of the capital city, with its wealth and cosmopolitanism, is forever gone. The question now is: will future political and economic balance between the different regions materialize through disintegration into a few weaker competing ‘nation-states’ – Darfur, Kordofan, the Red Sea, and so on? Or will it be achieved within the framework of a possibly stronger, more cohesive federal state of Sudan?
#Sudan Healthcare Workers
لا للحرب#
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