What are we to make of ‘the agreement’ signed yesterday between Hamdok and the Military? The threat of American sanctions on the coup leaders (Burhan and Hemedti) has quickly accomplished what diplomacy did not. But the situation has also gotten murkier. The resistance committees, major political parties and leaders, and the Professionals Association have rejected the agreement on the spot, while American and European allies welcomed it with caution. On social media, Hamdok has already been called a traitor. Seeing him sitting next to Burhan and Hemedti after their murderous rampage against protesters in the last three weeks is hard to stomach. Yet, it is not simple to render judgment about Hamdok’s commitment to the revolution or what this agreement will accomplish. We have little knowledge of the conditions under which Hamdok agreed to sign. He was under house arrest until yesterday, cut off from the rest of the world, with at least four members of his Cabinet detained in undisclosed locations. How possibly could he make a meaningful decision under these circumstances? Did he even know how many people were killed, injured, arrested, and abused by security forces, police and RSF militia since the coup?
On the surface, it appears that civilians have forced Burhan to cancel the decision removing Hamdok. But, the entire event in effect affirms the military’s power to dismiss and reinstate the Prime Minister at will, and to define the conditions of governance for the rest of the transitional period. The agreement document itself (Al-Rakuba Newspaper) is incoherent and full of ambiguity. Nothing is said of handing over the presidency of the Sovereign Council to civilians, which is now constitutionally overdue. But, wait, which sovereign council? Is it the original or the one that Burhan appointed after the coup? Instead of being the top priority, the release of political detainees is item 13 in the document. Only four, high profile, political leaders have been released since yesterday. The military coup order remains.
Hamdok has stated four reasons for signing the agreement: to help prevent more bloodshed, break the impasse and return the country to the transitional path, preserve the gains of the past two years on the peace and economy fronts, and strengthen democratic transformation by broadening participation and unifying all revolutionary forces (Al Jazeera Television). It is hard to disagree. As an economist, I deeply appreciate his desire to avoid squandering the remarkable achievements registered since 2019. From debt relief to a successful season in agriculture, these gains are in danger of being lost or compromised because of the coup. The question is: will returning to the same civilian-military partnership serve Hamdok’s goals? Now that his revolutionary mandate has somewhat eroded, how much can Hamdok accomplish? He has been criticized for what some see as a slow indecisive approach. This recent coup debacle may prompt him to act more expeditiously in the coming months. But, with so much opposition to the agreement, it’s fair to wonder whether he will even succeed in forming a new government from outside the coup supporters camp.
The agreement, whatever one may think of it, poses a test to the civilian side of the political scene. To recover some political capital, Hamdok must insist on three conditions before moving further: immediate release of all political detainees, beginning with Cabinet members; no violence against future protests; and immediately turning over presidency of the Sovereign Council to a civilian. How he deals with the military response to protests in the next few days will tell a great deal about his options and his trust in the revolutionaries’ power to help move his agenda forward. In the meantime, the resistance committees and other revolutionary forces must act with a firm understanding that they are engaged in a long battle that must be fought in different ways on all fronts, with some flexibility. They should continue to pressure Hamdok and the coup leaders, while taking every opportunity to participate in governance and decision making to shape the conditions that will ensure free and credible elections.
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