Saturday, April 9, 2022

Political Stasis and Justice in Sudan


More than five months now since Generals Abdel Fattah El-Burhan and Muhammad Hamdan Hemedti’s coup crashed the transition to civilian rule in Sudan, and turned the transitional period into a deadly uneven street battle between unarmed heroically brave young men and women determined to resist with peaceful means, and a ruthless killing machine of security, police, and militia forces. More than 90 people have been killed in Khartoum alone since October, thousands have been injured, and unknown numbers are detained in undisclosed locations. Leading the fight for a new Sudan, the resistance committees are sticking to their three noes: no legitimation, no negotiation, and no partnership with the coup leaders. They plan to continue the street protests until the military returns to ‘the barracks.’ 

In the meantime, the country is in a political stasis anchored in the unbridgeable distance between Burhan, Hemedti and their few supporters, on the one hand, and the civilian opposition, on the other. The coup side has the guns, but the overwhelming popular rejection of military rule is denying them legitimacy and ability to form a new government. Burhan and his ‘Minister of Finance’ lurch in the dark from one disastrous decision to another with no plan or discernible logic. Inflation is intolerable, the security situation in Khartoum is terrifying, and Darfur continues to bleed with real or orchestrated tribal violence. 

A unified civilian front has yet to materialize although everyone is calling for it. Almost every  resistance committee, political party, and professional association has a proposal for Sudan after defeating the coup, with details for elections, improving daily living conditions, and drafting a new national constitution. All agree on the general goals. Yet, no individual or party has managed to consolidate these proposals into one document, and the political parties show no sense of urgency about the need to defeat the coup itself first. In the absence of a unified alternative leadership, Burhan and Hemedti’s de facto rule hardens in place and leads the country further into ruin. The protests by themselves are not likely to bring down ‘the Palace,’ not without an unbearably high human cost. The two men have no qualms about murdering as many as it takes to remain in power. Khartoum now is looking more and more like a war zone, with barricades on major roads, and teargas canisters and bullets debris scattered all around. Every day that passes by gives Burhan and Hemedti license to wreak more havoc in every sector – from the economy, to security, to education. They are betting that sooner or later general sentiment within the older generations will turn toward accepting a nominally civilian government as economic hardship worsens while more young people die in the protests. 

The question is how to end the political stasis. The youth of the resistance committees hold the brightest hope for Sudan’s future. They have built an impressive set of organizations and spent a great deal of time in deep thought and dialogues about issues of freedom, peace and justice. Their horizontal internal structure is ideal for a durable democracy. But, there are more than 5,000 of them spread out across the country. The moment calls for a small civilian leadership body to present the pro-democracy alternative and to take over. The committees must mobilize beyond the street protests to lead a complete national disobedience campaign that dislodges the country out of its current stasis. 

After having thrown El-Bashir out of office, the choice now is between getting on with the task of rebuilding the country or letting it go down in flames by insisting on punishing Burhan, Hemedti, and Bashir loyalists for all their unforgivable crimes. The dilemma is that to resume the transition to civilian rule, the coup leaders must be peacefully but quickly removed from the political scene, which may require granting a safe exit to two known war criminals, and perhaps even a few of the National Congress Party’s worst offenders. To many, this represents a betrayal of the December Revolution’s ideal of justice – justice for the martyrs, the raped, the disappeared, and their families. But, justice has many facets. It is time to think of this ideal in a different way that still honors the memory and sacrifice of those who are lost or injured for life. Calls for hanging Burhan and Hemedti rest on a punitive, vengeful concept of justice. The martyrs’ sacrifice can be meaningfully honored by embracing the idea of constructive justice focused more on realizing their dreams of building a different, more just, country. The martyrs’ dreams are lost as long as the perpetrators are allowed to remain in power and reinstall all the elements of Bashir’s regime while civilians are busy picking at each other’s proposals for a new Sudan. 


Freedom, Peace, Justice!



Friday, January 28, 2022

Sudan Crisis Tests US Diplomacy and Commitment to Protecting Democracy Around the World

It’s been three months since the October 25th military coup derailed the transition to democracy in Sudan, and three weeks since Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned, leaving the Sudanese Revolution at the mercy of the coup leaders General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and warlord Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti. Burhan has named a caretaker government. Meanwhile, peaceful street protests and acts of civil disobedience continue mostly led by thousands of Resistance Committees across the country in heroic defiance of the deadly security and militia forces. The UN mediation process launched earlier this month has yet to yield a breakthrough because the coup leaders insist on participating in governance; while civilians reject any form of power sharing with the military. Unfortunately, the civilian opposition lacks a unified leadership, and no single figure has emerged for people to rally behind. Although multiple “initiatives” on how to complete the transitional period have appeared, these have not coalesced into one proposal. Thus, the impasse continues while all economic gains made under Hamdok’s government dissipate and vicious repression of protesters becomes the daily norm.

The US has condemned the military takeover in Sudan. But, so far, it has relied on diplomatic negotiations with the coup leaders and its regional allies – Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Israel – to restore the transitional process. Alas, all four openly support military rule in Sudan. For their part, the coup leaders have shown no sign of backing down; indeed, they have acted defiantly after every meeting with a US envoy. Burhan announced his coup barely an hour after Jeffrey Feltman, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, left Khartoum with assurances of the military’s commitment to the democratic transition. In November, Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, received similar assurances from Burhan. The next day peaceful protests were met with teargas and live ammunition. This week, Burhan again assured her military leaders were “committed to dialogue to resolve the current crisis.” As Phee herself stated in a tweet, what followed was “more violence against protestors [and] detention of civil society activists.” 

President Biden has made the protection of democracy a hallmark goal of his Administration. The crisis in Sudan is testing the US commitment to this goal and the efficacy of American diplomacy in achieving it. Major geopolitical fronts such as Russia and Ukraine typically occupy most of US foreign policy and media attention. And yet the way the Biden Administration handles struggles for democracy in seemingly insignificant countries like Sudan sends powerful signals to autocrats everywhere. The US could deploy the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which authorizes sanctions, such as freezing of assets, on government officials responsible for “gross violations of international recognized human rights,” including actions that suppress freedom of “expression, association, assembly and democratic elections.” Last year, the Treasury Department issued sanctions against three Cuban officials for “violence against peaceful protestors,” and against General Filipos Woldeyohannes, leader of the Eritrean Defense Forces, “for his connection with serious human rights abuse committed during the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia.” The Sudanese people have documented the military’s atrocities with dozens of video and audio evidence that should satisfy the “credible information” threshold for the Magnitsky Act. The one element that seems to separate Cuba and Eritrea from Sudan when it comes to the sanctions option is that American allies in the region are standing firm behind the Sudanese military. 

Congress has already begun the process for deploying targeted sanctions against the Sudanese army leaders. Last November, Senator Chris Coons filed legislation to authorize a Sudan Democracy Act that mandates sanctions “against individual actors who undermine a civilian-led democratic transition, peace, and human rights in Sudan.” Since then, over 70 protesters have been killed in Khartoum alone, thousands injured, and an unknown number, including children, are detained at undisclosed locations. The Sudanese army and its powerful militia leader have built a vast economic empire, with assets inside and outside Sudan. Sanctions on their individual and corporate holdings would disrupt the source of finance for their murderous campaign against protesters and weaken their power relative to the civilian opposition. 

On Monday, Assistant Secretary Phee stated that the coup leaders’ actions “tell a different story” than their public comments, and that their actions “will have consequences.” Next week, she will testify in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on “Sudan’s imperiled transition.” Based on her recommendations, the Sudan Democracy Act may move ahead in Congress, which would amount to an admission that diplomacy has failed. Only time will tell whether targeted sanctions will help dislodge the military from government in Sudan. But, the lesson for the Biden Administration is that allying with undemocratic regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Israel will not help protect democracy around the world. 

مليونية ١٧ يناير


Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Risch Statement on Violence During Sudanese Protests, November 17, 2021. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/risch-statement-on-violence-during-sudanese-protests. 

Sen. Coons files legislation to the National Defense Authorization Act to sanction Sudan’s military leaders. November 9, 2021. https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sen-coons-files-legislation-to-the-national-defense-authorization-act-to-sanction-sudans-military-leaders.

US Department of the Treasury Press Release, August 19, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0327 

US Department of the Treasury Press Release, August 23, 2021. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0329

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: US Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup” February 1, 2022. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/sudans-imperiled-transition-us-policy-in-the-wake-of-the-october-25th-coup-020122

Bureau of African Affairs. https://twitter.com/AsstSecStateAF/status/1485746693677199366