Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101-- Constitutional Declaration Signed

Sudan 2018-19 revolution 101

The CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

Today, August 17, witnessed the formal signing of the Constitutional Declaration by FFC (Forces for Freedom & Change) and TMC (Transitional Military Council), thereby launching the three-year transitional period toward democratic civilian rule in Sudan. The public has not seen the constitutional document yet, but it is reported that TMC did not get the blanket immunity they asked for, and that RSF will become part of the armed forces of Sudan, i.e., the regular army. The event was held with great formality and fanfare at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, and followed by enormous celebrations and self-congratulations by scores of Sudanese in this city and across the country.

The celebration is warranted as this day signals the end of Basheer and the National Congress Party’s 30-year destructive occupation of Sudan. For many Sudanese, these 30 years constitute a loss in the country’s historical ledger. Yet, the celebration must be tempered by deep awareness that this day represents only the first step in what will certainly be a long, difficult, and treacherous journey. There are too many complex problems to solve; too many different voices and opinions weighted down by heavy historical baggage; too much external influence and meddling; and the grave danger of armed conflict stemming from excessive militarization.

Ending the different internal wars by reaching permanent peace treaties with all the armed rebel movements is the top priority of the transitional government. But, the FFC coalition is already fractured because of the rebel movements’ insistence on special accommodations – specific shares of positions prior to the formation of the transitional government – to represent the marginalized areas and those affected by war. The contrast between the posh and polished scene at the Friendship Hall, and the helpless thousands whose homes were being swamped by torrential rain on the outskirts of Khartoum betrayed the problem of inequality and marginalization which the armed movements are fighting to end.

Another striking image today is the heavy presence of more than a dozen heads of state and high level representatives of different countries and international organizations – most notably, Chad, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the US, AU and EU. These are being called friends of Sudan, but their participation in the ceremony and especially co-signing of the constitutional document that will govern the transitional period eerily reveals the great fragility of the agreement, and the erosion of national autonomy that is the legacy of Basheer’s 30-year rule. One cannot but feel the irony that some Sudanese are recalling Muhammed Wardi’s celebrated ballad “Today We Raise the Flag of Our Independence” marking Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956. But, today the country is effectively in the custody of almost 10 external entities, soon to be joined (or rejoined) by the IMF and the World Bank. This loss of autonomy may be the worst of Basheer’s crimes against the people of Sudan, together with militarization, destruction of the economy and the civil service, and institution of tribal identities and divisions.

In all events, the transitional government and process will likely fall short of the greatness of the uprising and the protesters’ aspirations partly because the vast breadth of the FFC coalition and the matter-of-fact power of the military, in addition to international pressure, have allowed only a hybrid compromising outcome. Therefore, it would be a mistake to put all hopes on the transitional government, no matter how strong the civilian majority in it is. The great lesson of the past eight months, is that the Sudanese people have put together a highly effective model of peaceful civil organization, mass resistance, and long distance coordination. This was clear in the thousands of disciplined, highly responsive neighborhood committees and the communication channels between the street and FFC leadership that allowed quick mobilization of massive marches all over the country, especially during the Internet blackout, which TMC thought would paralyze the opposition. It is this energy and determination in the face of continued violence against peaceful protesters that will make possible the transition to democratic civilian rule and beyond. The protestors on the ground are the safety valve of the uprising against cooptation or sabotage.

Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101 -- The Agreement II

Sudan revolution 101

The Agreement II

August 17, 2019 -- It’s been more than a month since I wrote my last blog, on July 11. Much has occurred since then although not as much as the people in Sudan would like to see. I thought then the delay in signing the power sharing agreement between FFC (Forces for Freedom & Change, the Sudanese opposition coalition) and TMC (the Transitional Military Council) would not matter if more time was needed to achieve more clarity about critical issues, but it would be a setback if the delay simply led to new concessions to TMC. Two days later, people all over Sudan took to the streets to mark 40 days since the June 3^rd massacre, and to stress their demands for justice. By the end of the week, the African Union and Ethiopian mediators had announced that the two sides have signed the power sharing agreement.

Yet, soon it was revealed that what FFC and TMC signed on July 17 was a “Political Agreement,” laying out the by-then-familiar governance structure in the transitional period – a Sovereign Council, a Cabinet, and a Legislative Council. A second document named “the Constitutional Agreement” – governing the transitional period – was yet to be finalized and signed. This second step came as a surprise to most since there was no prior talk of two separate documents. The most astonishing development was that the political agreement just signed seemed to acquiesce to TMC’s desire for full immunity from criminal charges. This was met with general disapproval. The Communist Party, a member of FFC, rejected the agreement. So did three armed rebel movements (also FFC members), arguing that the “unique” concerns of people in marginalized regions were not recognized in the document. This threatened to derail the entire process. Swiftly arranged talks in Addis Ababa between FFC leadership and the rebels managed to smooth things over and avoid a total break-down.

In the meantime, TMC moved ahead with its ‘investigation’ of the June 3^rd massacre. As widely expected, the findings of their ‘commission of inquiry’ grossly underestimated the number of those killed or disappeared, and said nothing about the wide spread sexual assaults that accompanied the massacre. This sham was carried out even though the Political Agreement just signed stipulated forming an independent, regionally backed investigative body. FFC and protestors generally refused to accept this attempt to whitewash TMC’s involvement in the crime.

On July 30, as talks about the Constitutional document were underway, a unit of the Rapid Support Forces or other security/army personnel opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by high school students in El Obied, the third largest city outside of Khartoum. The students were protesting poor school conditions; in return, four of them were killed and dozens suffered injuries. The next day massive crowds marched in major cities around the country in solidarity. Collective anger over the murder of school children seems to have accelerated the pace of the talks over the constitutional document.

Since then, FFC & TMC have reached an agreement on the constitutional document, scheduled to be signed on August 17^th in a highly formalized ceremony, with attendance by representatives of several countries and regional and international political bodies. The three components of the transitional government would be formed and announced in the days to follow.

To say that all these arrangements are fragile would be a gross understatement. The process is taking too long, and the delays and passage of time provide ample opportunity for remnants of Basheer’s regime to intensify their destructive tactics, spread misinformation and sow division and mistrust within the FFC coalition.

The latest: The Constitutional Agreement was signed in Khartoum this afternoon.

@eimanzein

Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101 -- The Agreement

Sudan 2018-19 revolution 101

The Agreement

July 10 – It’s been almost a week since FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) and TMC (Transitional Military Council) reached the agreement of power sharing between civilians and soldiers during a transitional period of 3-years and 3 months. The final language and details of this agreement have been anticipated ever since and delayed a couple of times, but we have the outlines of the governing structure agreed upon: civilians will select the Cabinet of independent technocrats, while the Sovereign Council will consist of 6 civilians and 5 soldiers, with alternating chairmanship. The military will head the SC in the first 21 months, then civilians will take over the rest of the time. The two sides postponed settling the matter of the Legislative Council until the composition of the other two bodies of the transitional regime is determined.

The news was met with wide jubilation on the streets of Khartoum and other towns, although many of these celebrations emphasized justice for those killed in the June 3^rd massacre and since then. In social media, discussions were mostly positive, but quite a few voices expressed great disappointment, even dismay, at the prospect of the military participating in the transitional system of government. Some felt anger and betrayal, suggesting that the martyrs died for nothing. The general sentiment, however, has leaned toward seeing the agreement as an acceptable compromise to reach a peaceful resolution and take a step toward rebuilding the nation. The agreement must be looked at as a cease fire rather than a conclusion of the conflict.

While a ‘technical’ team worked to finalize the agreement, a few aspects of life began to recover as a condition for improving the climate for negotiations. Political prisoners were released. The Internet blackout ended only yesterday. It took longer than it should have, purportedly because of financial complications. As to the military presence in civilian areas, it is reported that some RSF/Janjaweed (Rapid Support Forces) are still seen on the streets of Khartoum, but they seem more subdued than they were at the height of the crisis. Establishing an independent commission to investigate the massacre and subsequent killings awaits the transitional government. It is expected to be a highly contentious matter.

The next few months will be critical because the first 6 months of the transition will be dedicated to establishing peace with up to 6 armed rebel movements in Darfur, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern provinces. Three of these movements are members of the FFC coalition. Although two have initially signaled their rejection of the agreement, the three have entered into talks with an FFC delegation in Addis Ababa. It’s not yet clear what these talks will yield, but the general issue of disarmament and streamlining the different militias and paramilitary groups in the country, especially RSF, and merging them with the regular armed forces may be the greatest challenge during the transition period and beyond. The agreement is very fragile if only for this reason.

July 11-12 – the final text of the agreement has yet to be released and signed by FFC and TMC. The delay will not matter if the result is simply getting more clarity about critical issues. On the other hand, it will pose a major setback or difficulty if the result shows new concessions to TMC. Patience on the streets is running low.