Sudan 2018-19 Revolution 101 -- The Agreement

Sudan 2018-19 revolution 101

The Agreement

July 10 – It’s been almost a week since FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) and TMC (Transitional Military Council) reached the agreement of power sharing between civilians and soldiers during a transitional period of 3-years and 3 months. The final language and details of this agreement have been anticipated ever since and delayed a couple of times, but we have the outlines of the governing structure agreed upon: civilians will select the Cabinet of independent technocrats, while the Sovereign Council will consist of 6 civilians and 5 soldiers, with alternating chairmanship. The military will head the SC in the first 21 months, then civilians will take over the rest of the time. The two sides postponed settling the matter of the Legislative Council until the composition of the other two bodies of the transitional regime is determined.

The news was met with wide jubilation on the streets of Khartoum and other towns, although many of these celebrations emphasized justice for those killed in the June 3^rd massacre and since then. In social media, discussions were mostly positive, but quite a few voices expressed great disappointment, even dismay, at the prospect of the military participating in the transitional system of government. Some felt anger and betrayal, suggesting that the martyrs died for nothing. The general sentiment, however, has leaned toward seeing the agreement as an acceptable compromise to reach a peaceful resolution and take a step toward rebuilding the nation. The agreement must be looked at as a cease fire rather than a conclusion of the conflict.

While a ‘technical’ team worked to finalize the agreement, a few aspects of life began to recover as a condition for improving the climate for negotiations. Political prisoners were released. The Internet blackout ended only yesterday. It took longer than it should have, purportedly because of financial complications. As to the military presence in civilian areas, it is reported that some RSF/Janjaweed (Rapid Support Forces) are still seen on the streets of Khartoum, but they seem more subdued than they were at the height of the crisis. Establishing an independent commission to investigate the massacre and subsequent killings awaits the transitional government. It is expected to be a highly contentious matter.

The next few months will be critical because the first 6 months of the transition will be dedicated to establishing peace with up to 6 armed rebel movements in Darfur, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern provinces. Three of these movements are members of the FFC coalition. Although two have initially signaled their rejection of the agreement, the three have entered into talks with an FFC delegation in Addis Ababa. It’s not yet clear what these talks will yield, but the general issue of disarmament and streamlining the different militias and paramilitary groups in the country, especially RSF, and merging them with the regular armed forces may be the greatest challenge during the transition period and beyond. The agreement is very fragile if only for this reason.

July 11-12 – the final text of the agreement has yet to be released and signed by FFC and TMC. The delay will not matter if the result is simply getting more clarity about critical issues. On the other hand, it will pose a major setback or difficulty if the result shows new concessions to TMC. Patience on the streets is running low.