Sudan revolution 101
The Agreement II
August 17, 2019 -- It’s been more than a month since I wrote my last blog, on
July 11. Much has occurred since then although not as much as the people in
Sudan would like to see. I thought then the delay in signing the power sharing agreement
between FFC (Forces for Freedom & Change, the Sudanese opposition
coalition) and TMC (the Transitional Military Council) would not matter if more
time was needed to achieve more clarity about critical
issues, but it would be a setback if the delay simply led to new concessions to
TMC. Two days later, people all over Sudan took to the streets to mark 40 days
since the June 3rd massacre, and to stress their demands for justice.
By the end of the week, the African Union and Ethiopian mediators had announced
that the two sides have signed the power sharing agreement.
Yet, soon it was revealed that what FFC and TMC
signed on July 17 was a “Political Agreement,” laying out the by-then-familiar governance
structure in the transitional period – a Sovereign Council, a Cabinet, and a
Legislative Council. A second document named “the Constitutional Agreement” –
governing the transitional period – was yet to be finalized and signed. This second
step came as a surprise to most since there was no prior talk of two separate
documents. The most astonishing development was that the political agreement
just signed seemed to acquiesce to TMC’s desire for full immunity
from criminal charges. This was met with general disapproval. The
Communist Party, a member of FFC, rejected the agreement. So did three armed
rebel movements (also FFC members), arguing that the “unique” concerns of
people in marginalized regions were not recognized in the document. This
threatened to derail the entire process. Swiftly arranged talks in Addis Ababa between
FFC leadership and the rebels managed to smooth things over and avoid a total break-down.
In the meantime, TMC moved ahead with its ‘investigation’
of the June 3rd massacre. As widely expected, the findings of their
‘commission of inquiry’ grossly underestimated the number of those killed or
disappeared, and said nothing about the wide spread sexual assaults that
accompanied the massacre. This sham was carried out even though the Political Agreement
just signed stipulated forming an independent, regionally backed investigative body.
FFC and protestors generally refused to accept this attempt to whitewash TMC’s
involvement in the crime.
On July 30, as talks about the Constitutional
document were underway, a unit of the Rapid Support Forces or other security/army
personnel opened fire on a peaceful demonstration by high school students in El
Obied, the third largest city outside of Khartoum. The students were protesting
poor school conditions; in return, four of them were killed and dozens suffered
injuries. The next day massive crowds marched in major cities around the
country in solidarity. Collective anger over the murder of school children seems
to have accelerated the pace of the talks over the constitutional document.
Since then, FFC & TMC have reached an
agreement on the constitutional document, scheduled to be signed on August 17th
in a highly formalized ceremony, with attendance by representatives of several countries
and regional and international political bodies. The three components of the
transitional government would be formed and announced in the days to follow.
To say that all these arrangements are fragile
would be a gross understatement. The process is taking too long, and the delays
and passage of time provide ample opportunity for remnants of Basheer’s regime
to intensify their destructive tactics, spread misinformation and sow division
and mistrust within the FFC coalition.
The latest: The Constitutional Agreement was
signed in Khartoum this afternoon.
@eimanzein
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