Adding Insult to Injury

Day 9 of General Abdel Fattah El-Burhan’s doomed military coup. Protests have continued, culminating in the massive October 30 marches inside Sudan and in 70 cities around the world. The cycle of resistance and repression goes on. Unarmed demonstrators are met with tear gas and live ammunition, and security forces are carrying out a wide campaign of arrests against civilian leaders and activists. The Internet blackout remains. Yet, civil disobedience is largely holding up; most private business and government offices are closed. Adding insult to injury, Burhan ordered the release from prison of several leading figures of El-Bashir’s deposed regime, while keeping Prime Minster Hamdok and the majority of his Cabinet under arrest. Fortunately, this brazen move crystallizes the coup’s primary goal: to bring back Bashir’s ousted dictatorship under new management. 

The truth of the matter is that the Bashir regime has never left since he was ousted in April 2019. Its core elements are still in place: military empire, security forces, the Muslim Brothers’ business monopolies, and thousands of loyalists installed throughout the civil service. All along, this coalition has been busy manufacturing crises, from extreme shortages of daily consumer goods to random muggings and other personal safety violations, in hopes of inducing frustration and impatience with the Transitional Government. The latest one of these destructive efforts was the closure of shipping facilities in Port Sudan for more than a month under the guise of a protest by people in the eastern region, which has created more shortages and cost the country millions of dollars in shipping fines every day. This well-funded and organized campaign has succeeded in inflicting great hardship on regular people, but has not broken their resolve to return to full civilian rule.   

Burhan has yet to form the new government he promised, although he made a few key appointments. First, he doesn’t have a political base beside Bashir loyalists and two opportunistic armed rebel movement leaders. No independent credible candidates are lining up to fill vacant positions. Second, Bashir loyalists are known for preferring to cause mayhem only in the dark; they don’t have the courage to face the massive opposition, which has hardened since the coup. The popular resistance committees are now unwilling to return to the power sharing arrangement with the military. For them, nothing but a fully civilian government will do this time. Any Burhan government will be immediately rejected on the street. (“Burhan doesn't have a clean path to form a government in the way that he wanted,” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-military-leaders-could-face-isolation-after-coup-2021-11-01/ ). 

Representatives from the troika countries, the UN, and South Sudan are in Khartoum to mediate. It appears five compromise proposals are circulating. Prime Minister Hamdok is rightly insisting on the release of all who have been arrested, including his Cabinet members, and restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Government before entertaining any proposals. Burhan has miscalculated. Yesterday, in a clear sign of confusion, the Bashir loyalists released just two days ago were arrested again. The push back from the street has far exceeded his expectations. His regional backers – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE – are silent. With the exception of Russia and Israel, there appears to be no sympathizers with his coup. But, don’t hang high hopes on the ‘international community.’ It hasn’t come through for the people of Myanmar. What will matter is whether the balance of international and regional geopolitical and economic interests in Sudan favors the Generals or the street. 

حرية سلام و عدالة

Freedom, Peace, Justice

Translation by Adil Zeinelabdin

زيادة الطين بلة

اليوم التاسع من انقلاب الجنرال عبد الفتاح البرهان العسكري المشؤوم. تواصلت الاحتجاجات لتبلغ ذروتها في مواكب 30 أكتوبر الهائلة داخل السودان وفي 70 مدينة حول العالم. وهكذا فإن دائرة القمع والمقاومة تدور. تواجه المظاهرات السلمية بالغاز المسيل للدموع زالرصاص الحي، وتقوم قوات الامن بحملات اعتقالات واسعة تجاه القادة المدنيين والنشطاء بينما لاتزال خدمة الانترنت مقطوعة. ورغم ذلك فإن العصيان المدني مازال صامدا بدرجة كبيرة؛ فغالبية محلات القطاع الخاص والمكاتب الحكومية مازالت مغلقة. أما ما زاد الطين بلة فهو إقدام البرهان على الإفراج عن عدد من الشخسيات البارزة في نظام المخلوع البشيربينما أبقى على رئيس الوزراء حمدوك ومعظم أفراد طاقمه الوزاري رهن الاعتقال. ولحسن الحط فأن هذه الخطوة الجريئة بلورت الهدف الرئيس وراء الانقلاب، وهوإعادة نظام البشيرالمباد تحت إدارة جديدة.  

في حقيقة الامر فإن نظام البشير لم يرحل إطلاقا منذ الاطاحة به في أبريل 2019. فكل أعضاؤه الاساسيون مازالوا في أماكنهم: الامبراطورية العسكرية، القوات الأمنية، احتكارات رجال أعمال الاخوان المسلمين، وآلاف الموالين الذين تم زرعهم في مفاصل الخدمة المدنية. ظل هذا التحالف طوال الوقت مشغولا بصنع الازمات من نقص حاد في السلع الاستهلاكية اليومية إلى أعمال النهب العشوائية والانتهاكات الامنية الشخصية الاخرى، على أمل إحداث إحباط وعدم صبر على الحكومة الانتقالية. آخر هذه الجهود المدمرة كان إغلاق مراقق الشحن في ميناء بورت سودان لأكثر من شهر وذلك تحت ستار احتجاجات مواطني اقليم الشرق، والتي خلقت المزيد من النقص وكلفت البلاد ملايين الدولارات يوميا في شكل غرامات شحن. هذه الحملة المنطمة والممولة جيدا نجحت في إلحاق الكثير من المشقة والعنت بالناس العاديين لكنها لم تفلح في كسر تصميمهم وعزمهم على العودة الكاملة للحكم المدني.  

لم يفي البرهان حتى الآن بوعده تشكيل حكومة رغم أنه قد قام بالقليل من التعيينات المفتاحية. أولاً: لا يملك البرهان قاعدة سياسية غير أنصار البشير واثنين من قادة الحركات المسلحة الانتهازيين. فليس هناك رتل من المرشحين المستقلين ذوي المصداقية مصطفين لملء المقاعد الشاغرة. ثانيا: إن أنصار البشير معروف عنهم أنهم يفضلون إثارة القلاقل في الظلام فحسب، فهم لا يملكون الشجاعة لمواجهة معارضة واسعة النطاق  ما ازدادت إلا صلابة منذ الانقلاب. إن لجان المقاومة الشعبية هي الان لا تريد العودة إلى اتفاقية شراكة السلطة مع العسكر. فبالنسبة لهم لا شئ يمكن قبوله هذه المرة غير الحكم المدني الكامل. إن أي حكومة يشكلها البرهان سوف يتم رفضها مباشرة من قبل الشارع.  (" البرهان لايملك سبيلا ممهدا لتشكيل حكومة بالطريقة التي يريدها.")  

 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-military-leaders-could-face-isolation-after-coup-2021-11-01/).   

إن مندوين من دول الترويكا ، الامم المتحدة، وجنوب السودان متواجدون في الخرطوم للوساطة ويبدو أن هناك خمس مقترحات تسوية يتم تداولها.  فرئيس الوزراء حمدوك مصر وبحق على إطلاق سراح كل الذين اعتقلوا ومن بينهم وزرائه، واستعادة الحكومة الانتقالية بقيادة مدنية قبل النظر في أية مقترحات. لقد أخطأ البرهان الحسابات. بالأمس وفي إشارة واضحة للتخبط، فإن أنصار البشير الذين أطلق سراحهم قبل يومين فقط، تم اعتقالهم مرة أخرى. أن الدفع العكسي من الشارع  قد فاق كل توقعاته، وحلفاؤه الاقليميون – مصر، السعودية، والامارات صامتون. فباستثناء روسيا وإسرائيل، فلا يظهر أن هناك متعاطفين مع انقلابه. لكن لا يجب التعويل كثيرا على "المجتمع الدولي". فها هو لم يقم بواجبه  لنجدة الناس في ميانمار. الذي يبقي في النهاية هو ما إذا كانت كفة الموازين الجيوسياسية الدولية والاقليمية والمصالح الاقتصادية في السودان ستميل نحو الجنرالات أم الشارع.  

 ترجمة الأستاذ عادل زين العابدين  

 

What's Behind the Coup

Despite General Abdel Fattah El-Burhan’s false claim that he ceased power to prevent a civil war, the motives behind the military coup in Sudan are transparent. The Sudanese situation is extremely complicated, but Burhan and Hemedti, the coup leaders, have one goal: to preempt handing over presidency of the Sovereign Council to civilians, which is due to take place next month based on the Constitutional Document that governs the transitional period. The power grab couldn’t be more apparent. The generals’ wish list is very short: to avoid accountability for their past crimes in Darfur and elsewhere, and to maintain the financial and political power they gained during the years of Omar El-Bashir’s dictatorship. Both wishes satisfy the coup supporters, Bashir regime remnants and sympathizers whose ambitions of tyranny and theft, and stranglehold on the economy are known to the Sudanese people. 

In the last three decades, the military establishment has built a vast commercial empire of over 200 companies dealing in arms and ammunition, mining, construction, and many other ventures. They enjoy extensive tax exemptions and operate outside the national budget. In effect, the Sudanese military comprises an economically autonomous entity that exists in parallel to other state bodies, with no transparency or accountability. Hemedti has his own ruthless army of Rapid Support Forces who are currently terrorizing protestors in Khartoum and other cities. He refuses to abide by the Juba Peace Agreement, by which his militia is to be absorbed in the national armed forces. He has amassed wealth from control of gold mining in western Sudan and other enterprises, and maintains his own political relations with other countries. Prime Minister Hamdok has rightly described this ungoverned position of the military in Sudan as unacceptable. The Transitional Government, despite some missteps and shortcomings, had begun a process to correct this complex untenable situation. The generals couldn’t let this happen. 

On this fifth day of the coup, a new government has yet to be announced. There is great uncertainty. But from the continuing strong resistance to the coup, one thing is clear: a civilian government is coming; sooner or later, with more or less bloodshed. What the coup enforcers had hoped to achieve is to keep their leadership in the remainder of the transitional period, and then ensure that a government of their making comes to power via elections in 2023. Burhan’s selective suspension of the Constitutional Document is revealing. The suspended Article 16.5 concerns the formation of independent national commissions, including the critical commissions for Constitution Drafting; Elections; Anti-Corruption and Public Funds Recovery; and Transitional Justice. In other words, the intention is to upend all efforts to hold the generals and other Bashir operatives accountable in the next two years, and to gain control over the crafting of election laws and implementation logistics, giving themselves a good chance of getting a favorable outcome in 2023. This bears chilling resemblance to the Republicans’ playbook in the US. 

حرية سلام و عدالة

Freedom, Peace, Justice

Coup & Resistance

On October 25th, after having toppled the thirty-year brutal dictatorship of Omar El-Bashir in 2019, Sudan returned to Square 1. A military coup headed by General Abdul Fattah El-Burhan, head of the Transitional Sovereign Council, ceased power. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, head of the Transitional Government, and most members of his Cabinet were arrested. This has effectively ended the fragile power sharing arrangement of the last two years, and derailed the transition to full civilian rule. As Sudanese observers note, Burhan’s move simply crystallizes a postponed, unavoidable confrontation.

The coup is perpetrated by military generals (Burhan and Hemedti), the two Darfur armed rebel movement leaders who signed the Juba Peace Agreement last year (Minnawi and Ibrahim), and a faceless band of Bashir regime remnants and sympathizers, with suspected support from Egypt and UAE. Members of the banned Islamist Congress Party that ruled Sudan for three decades until the fall of Bashir have never stopped plotting to undermine the Transitional Government’s work to rehabilitate the economy and seek justice for victims of war and other crimes committed during his reign. Last month, this trio of army generals, disgraced rebel leaders, and Bashir operatives led a modest counter protest in support of the military, and created a narrative that the Sudanese are split over whether civilians or soldiers should govern. The massive nationwide demonstrations on October 21st in support of full civilian rule discredit this narrative.  

Following the coup, demonstrations immediately broke out in Khartoum and other cities. Yesterday, PM Hamdok and his wife were released but remain under house arrest. Most Cabinet members are still detained at an undisclosed location, and more arrests of political leaders and journalists are taking place. The Sudanese street remains adamantly against the coup, flooded with the young revolutionaries, working day and night to block roads with barricades and burning tires. The Sudanese Professionals Association has called for complete civil disobedience, and waves of strikes have begun – doctors, lawyers, teachers and bankers, among others, are on strike. Sudanese ambassadors continue to publicly denounced the coup from different capitals around the world, and rallies are organized in Washington DC, London, and other major cities. 

In tragic but classic exercise of brute force, protesters are being shot dead on the streets of Khartoum. Hemedti’s Rapid Support Force and other militias are combing neighborhoods, terrorizing and killing members of the resistance committees. Burhan and Hemedti’s bloody record of atrocities in Darfur is well known. They showed how far they can go in the Ramadan massacre of June 3, 2019. No doubt they will cause as much bloodshed as necessary to hold on to power. They have the guns. Revolutionaries have their goal of “freedom, peace, and justice,” and the determined peaceful resistance that brought down mighty Bashir two years ago. Resistance is far from futile!

SAPAA Statement on Sudan Coup Attempt

"We have closely monitored events in Sudan, and we are alarmed by the news of an aborted military coup in Khartoum. We strongly condemn any attempt to reverse the Sudanese people's march toward full civilian rule. We stand in solidarity with Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government which was born out of the struggle and the sacrifices of the people of Sudan to achieve Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

We recognize the difficult economic conditions experienced by the common Sudanese people, and the many political challenges facing the transitional government. However, the path towards democracy and full civilian rule should never be jeopardized or reversed by military interventions. Unfortunately, the history of Sudan is full of such reckless and disastrous interference with the democratic process with devastating consequence for the people of Sudan.

We call on all partners of the transitional government (military and civilian) to rededicate themselves to the path of a fully democratic transition and intensify their efforts to complete formation of all remaining governance bodies stipulated in the Constitutional Document. The people of Sudan have suffered for too long and they deserve no less.

The US government has sent a clear and strong message condemning any attempt to seize power and warning any party that threatens the democratic transition in Sudan. We applaud the swift and firm stand of the administration.

We will continue to monitor events on the ground, voice our solidarity with our brothers and sisters in Sudan, and demand action from the transitional government partners to fulfill the promise of the revolution.

With Care,

Sudanese American Public Affairs Association"

https://www.sapaa.org/

Don’t Topple the Transitional Government, Prepare for Elections

 

Lack of patience and confidence in democratic civilian rule have undermined Sudanese revolutions since independence. They are threatening to do it again. Wishing to change the transitional government now, instead of preparing for elections, only serves the vestiges of Bashir’s regime. Revolutionaries must show the same clarity of mind, patience, and discipline with which these remnants are working to undermine the December Revolution.  

From the outset, we knew that the transitional government faces monumental challenges. The scope and complexity of the problems created by 30-years of Bashir’s dictatorship is staggering. The diversity of the FFC coalition, and the military’s stranglehold, in addition to the brew of foreign interests in Sudan’s affairs gave rise to a comprise government tasked with undoing an unimaginable level of all around damage. So, instead of focusing on what could be, one must appreciate what has been accomplished in less than two years of transition.

On the issue of economic recovery, Hamdok’s Government, as many like to call it, has succeeded in getting Sudan off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which was crucial to ending decades-long economic isolation, and beginning to tackle the massive external debt. The conditions necessary to qualify for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative are tough, but Bashir’s regime has left the country little choice. Looking at the removal of subsidies and streamlining the exchange rates as just another bad ‘neoliberal’ IMF/World Bank recipe is an all-or-nothing view that does not serve under the circumstances. To get out of the crippling external debt, dealing with the IMF and the World Bank is unavoidable. The more productive thing to do now is to take advantage of every resource they make available – for example, register as many as possible for the Family Support Program. What will matter for economic recovery and growth from here onward is judicious practical economic planning within the present constraints. Understandably, people on the street are growing more restless because of crushing inflation and shortage of necessary goods and services. The daily hardship is undeniable. But ideological opposition to economic reforms adds to dangerous impatience with the Revolution’s own government. Any new government will reset the clock back to zero.

If there is any hope of holding on to democratic civilian rule, it’s worth remembering that Hamdok’s Government has carried on under relentless, well-organized sabotage by the remnants of Bashir’s regime, in addition to the pandemic and conflict with Ethiopia. The transitional government is slowly, but surely, laying a foundation for an elected body to implement the will of the people on more solid ground than when it came into office. The highest priority today is to support this government and earnestly prepare for national elections. Otherwise, guess who will come back to power?

Sudan Revolution -- Almost Two Years of Transitional Government

It's been a long detour of busy work and COVID-19 havoc since my last post, "the Challenge of Peace," written just after the signing of the Constitutional Declaration and formation of the new Cabinet. Any idea of peace seemed elusive until the Juba Peace Agreement was reached in October 2020. Negotiations between the Transitional Government (TG) and armed rebel movements stalled almost every time they neared resolution. The process was suspended after an armed attack on IDP camps in Fata Borno in northern Darfur. But, in the end, an agreement was signed with the Revolutionary Front, comprised of nine rebel groups, most notably the Justice and Equality Movement, and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army.

The Agreement's eight protocols mandate dissolution of the Front's militias and their integration into the regular army, implementation of justice and reparations, resolution of land disputes and development of Darfur's rural economy, return or resettlement of refugees and IDPs, wealth sharing, and power sharing during the now extended transitional period. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement did not sign. However, the former has since come to an agreement on "principles" and talks are currently under way with TG. As many realize, the Juba Agreement is flawed. But, it remains an important step on Sudan's path to "freedom, peace, and justice."

In addition, TG has succeeded in getting Sudan removed from the terrorism-sponsoring states list, which it occupied for decades, thereby, helping to end the country's economic isolation and to deal with the crippling $60 billion external debt. This required meeting the conditions necessary to qualify for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Streamlining the Sudanese Pound's exchange rates is the most recent of these conditions. Almost immediately, the US Treasury Department provided more than a billion dollars in bridge financing to help clear Sudan's debt to the World Bank. In May, the "Friends of Sudan" Paris Conference hosted by President Macron paved the way to settling Sudan's debt to the IMF.

The display of good will toward Sudan remains high. Beside the European Union, the US, France, and the UK, the "friends of Sudan" include most major western European nations, China, Japan, Russia, and a host of African and Arab "allies" such as the African Union, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. For now, this multinational coalition is keeping the military in check. Unfortunately, the global enthusiasm for the Sudanese revolution also underscores the magnitude of competing agendas and strategic interests in Sudan's affairs. TG has an unenviable task of balancing domestic and external pressures.

On the domestic front, young revolutionaries and other folk are growing more restless under suffocating inflation and shortages of fuel and electricity, among other necessities. Dissatisfaction with the slow pace of justice, and ideological opposition to IMF/World Bank reforms add to dangerous impatience. Some have called for toppling 'Hamdok's government.' The hardship on the streets is undeniable; but, the difficult nature of the transition was expected from the outset. If there is any hope of holding on to democratic civilian rule, it's worth remembering a few things. First, the scope and complexity of the problems created by 30-years of Bashir's dictatorship is staggering. TG has managed to accomplish some significant goals while fighting relentless, well-organized sabotage by the remnants of his regime, in addition to the pandemic and a new border conflict with Ethiopia. Second, there are no easy solutions to the debt problem; dealing with the IMF and the World Bank is unavoidable. Yet, what will matter for economic recovery and growth from here onward are judicious national economic plans and careful choices to be made within the current constraints. Third, TG is slowly laying a foundation for an elected government to implement the will of the people -- including on the economy -- on more solid ground. The critical priority for the struggling masses today is to organize and prepare for national elections, whenever they may come. If the necessary political infrastructure for elections is not ready by then, guess who will come back to power?