Sudan 2018-19 revolution 101
The Agreement
July 10 – It’s been almost a week since FFC (Forces for Freedom and Change) and TMC (Transitional Military Council) reached
the agreement of power sharing between civilians and soldiers during a transitional
period of 3-years and 3 months. The final language and details of this
agreement have been anticipated ever since and delayed a couple of times, but
we have the outlines of the governing structure agreed upon: civilians will
select the Cabinet of independent technocrats, while the Sovereign Council will
consist of 6 civilians and 5 soldiers, with alternating chairmanship. The
military will head the SC in the first 21 months, then civilians will take over
the rest of the time. The two sides postponed settling the matter of the Legislative
Council until the composition of the other two bodies of the transitional regime
is determined.
The news was met with wide jubilation on the streets of
Khartoum and other towns, although many of these celebrations emphasized justice
for those killed in the June 3rd massacre and since then. In social media,
discussions were mostly positive, but quite a few voices expressed great disappointment,
even dismay, at the prospect of the military participating in the transitional system
of government. Some felt anger and betrayal, suggesting that the martyrs died
for nothing. The general sentiment, however, has leaned toward seeing the
agreement as an acceptable compromise to reach a peaceful resolution and take a
step toward rebuilding the nation. The agreement must be looked at as a cease
fire rather than a conclusion of the conflict.
While a ‘technical’ team
worked to finalize the agreement, a few aspects of life began to recover as a
condition for improving the climate for negotiations. Political prisoners were
released. The Internet blackout ended only yesterday. It took longer than it
should have, purportedly because of financial complications. As to the military
presence in civilian areas, it is reported that some RSF/Janjaweed (Rapid Support Forces) are still
seen on the streets of Khartoum, but they seem more subdued than they were at
the height of the crisis. Establishing an independent commission to investigate
the massacre and subsequent killings awaits the transitional government. It is
expected to be a highly contentious matter.
The next few months will be critical because the first 6
months of the transition will be dedicated to establishing peace with up to 6
armed rebel movements in Darfur, southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern
provinces. Three of these movements are members of the FFC coalition. Although
two have initially signaled their rejection of the agreement, the three have
entered into talks with an FFC delegation in Addis Ababa. It’s not yet clear
what these talks will yield, but the general issue of disarmament and streamlining
the different militias and paramilitary groups in the country, especially RSF, and
merging them with the regular armed forces may be the greatest challenge during
the transition period and beyond. The agreement is very fragile if only for
this reason.
July 11-12 – the final text of the agreement has yet to be released and
signed by FFC and TMC. The delay will not matter if the result is simply getting more clarity about critical issues. On the other hand, it will
pose a major setback or difficulty if the result shows new concessions to TMC. Patience
on the streets is running low.